


**HUMANIST
RELIGION**



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


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HUMANIST RELIGION



BY

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"Humanist Sermons"*

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INTRODUCTION

IT may be that there would be some advantage in starting a movement *de novo*, provided of course one could find a basic idea that had no history. However this may be, Humanism has a history and must make the most of it. The Humanist idea has found expression in varying forms in many lands and among many peoples. Any idea that is vital grows through the years. It is not to be expected that such an idea will always be consistent in details. It is enough if there is continuity of fundamental purpose.

Valid Humanist movements, however they may differ in minor respects, have this in common, viz., (1) the centering of attention upon human interests, (2) the use, the control, and the altering of reality for human ends, and (3) the holding of doctrines as hypothetical and ideals as tentative.

To-day, as never before, Humanism is making itself felt in religious circles. Throughout the world good and able persons are alarmed over its spread. Sincere and earnest ministers misrepresent and denounce it. Certain religious journals flay it without mercy. Pious persons who are otherwise tolerant quiver with fear and rage at the mention of it.

I myself have no interest in Humanism merely as a

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doctrine of protest, nor as a type of criticism, and much less as an anti-ecclesiastical complex. My concern is for humanism as a philosophy of life—in sharp contrast with opposing schools of thought—able to challenge the traditional philosophies and ethnic religions, having a program covering all aspects of human well-being, and aiming at the complete possession of the territory of the human spirit. Short of this, Humanism would merely add another to the already overcrowded field of warring sects.

Rigorous thinking on a factual basis is one of the greatest needs of to-day. The temptation to slovenly thought is great, but religious leaders cannot afford to succumb to it, nor can they successfully dodge philosophical issues by avowing practical aims. The philosophical and the practical are forever intertwined; that is, theory and practice go together. The chapters that follow are experiments in this direction.

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HUMANIST RELIGION

I

THE MAJOR PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE

MATERIALISM—THEISM—HUMANISM

PHILOSOPHY, properly understood, is perhaps the most important of all studies. It is not, however, to be thought of as a system of *a priori* hypotheses, but rather the art of thinking in an orderly way, and on the basis of factual experience, about one's total situation. In recent times the idea has taken hold of many minds that philosophy must give way to the sciences. I regard the growth of the sciences as the most encouraging of modern developments; but the basic terms and concepts of the sciences need constant critical scrutiny, and the results of scientific inquiry inevitably lead thoughtful persons to wonder what it is all about. The examination of terms and concepts is the critical function of philosophy, and the attempt to form opinions about the significance of experience is its speculative function. Without this critical and speculative service, the sciences would suffer and life adjustments in a world sometimes all too chaotic become even more difficult than they are at present.

The focusing of attention upon the sciences, and especially of late upon technology, has taken attention away from the far-reaching problems of man's place in the

cosmic arrangement. But the "how" of things, which in the past has been the particular interest of science, cannot thrive unless someone attends to the "why" of things, which in the past has been the particular interest of philosophy. Nor can the "why" be fruitful unless someone attends to the problem of "how" things come about. In other words, philosophy must become scientific, and science, philosophical.

After all the marvelous progress of modern life we still find ourselves puzzled over the old problem of the nature of being, and still wondering whether in point of fact there is an increasing purpose running through the ages and if so, what it is.

It is no surprise to find this state of uncertainty about things cosmic when one considers the causes that lead to it. First of all there is the appalling state of the human race. Poverty and ignorance, disease and war, and the like, menace the human family. Ages pass and conditions are changed but little, and not always for the better. Then there is the old naturalism which spreads terror. One could fairly hear the squeak of the cosmic wheels as they rolled relentlessly through the years, and feel the cold blast of surely enveloping winter as it chilled the soul. We were taught that the universe itself was running down at a terrific speed. The classic expression illustrative of man's desperate situation is found in Bertrand Russell's *The Free Man's Worship*. In another characteristic statement from his pen, as quoted by Hoernlé in *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, he says: "The universe as astronomy reveals it

is very vast. How much there may be beyond what our telescopes show, we cannot tell; but what we can know is of unimaginable immensity. In the visible world the Milk Way is a tiny fragment; within this fragment, the solar system is an infinitesimal speck, and of this speck our planet is a microscopic dot. On this dot, tiny lumps of impure carbon and water, of complicated structure, with somewhat unusual physical and chemical properties, crawl about for a few years, until they are compounded. They divide their time between labour designed to postpone the moment of dissolution for themselves and frantic struggles to hasten it for others of their kind. Natural convulsions periodically destroy some thousands or millions of them, and disease prematurely sweeps away many more. These events are considered to be misfortunes; but when men succeed in inflicting similar destruction by their own efforts, they rejoice, and give thanks to God. In the life of the solar system, the period during which the existence of man will have been physically possible is a minute portion of the whole; but there is some reason to hope that even before this period is ended man will have set a term to his own existence by his efforts at mutual annihilation. Such is man's life viewed from the outside."

Another classic utterance in similar vein, but with a different purpose in view, is from Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*. He says: "Man—past, present and future—lays claim to our devotion. What, then, can we say of him? Man, so far as natural science by itself

is able to teach us, is no longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaven-descended heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his story a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which first converted a dead organic compound into the living progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine, disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a race with conscience enough to feel that it is vile, and intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant. We survey the past, and see that its history is of blood and tears, of helpless blundering, of wild revolt, of stupid acquiescence, of empty aspirations. We sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contended silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. Imperishable monuments and immortal deeds, death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as though they had never been. Nor will anything that *is* be better or be worse for all that the labour,

genius, devotion, and suffering of man have striven through countless generations to effect."

It is not yet possible to feel altogether comfortable about the environing situation, but our fears are a bit assuaged by the increasing testimony of competent thinkers to the effect that, while our knowledge of the universe does not allow us to affirm dogmatically that we are the favorites of the cosmos, neither does it allow us to pronounce dogmatically the final doom of all things good and fair. Professor Perry of Harvard in his *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, says: "To pretend to speak for the universe in terms of the narrow and abstract predictions of astronomy, is to betray a bias of mind that is little less provincial and unimaginative than the most naïve anthropomorphism. What that residual cosmos which looms beyond the border of knowledge shall in time bring forth, no man that has yet been born can say. That it may overbalance and remake the little world of things known, and falsify every present prophecy, no man can doubt. It is as consistent with rigorous thought to greet it as a promise of salvation, as to dread it as a portent of doom. And if it be granted that in either case it is a question of over-belief, of the hazard of faith, no devout soul can hesitate."

Professor Lewis of the University of California, in a work on *The Anatomy of Science*, testifies that he finds no evidence that the universe is running down; and Professor Millikan believes that he has found positive evidence that the creative process still functions on a cosmic scale.

While such testimony is encouraging, especially since the feeling of dependence that most of us have to an alarming degree predisposes us in favor of facts or even theories that increase our confidence in cosmic support, it is, nevertheless, a long leap from such fragmentary bits of hope to the affirmation of a purposeful universe, which concerns itself with human affairs. And I myself am not prepared to make it, save as the idea may apply to orderly movement and to the achievement of parts.

The idea of purpose carries us beyond piecemeal issues to considerations of the whole, so it is fundamentally a religious problem; and for this reason, among others, the warfare of conflicting ideas of purpose has been intense, sometimes bitter. There is a feeling, which I believe to be well grounded, that what one thinks about the problem of purpose really makes a difference in human conduct. The idea of purpose, therefore, should be studied not merely in the light of personal experience, which is oftentimes crude and chaotic, but in the light of highly organized systems of thought as worked out by mature minds. The effect in personal development and social action of theories held on such a subject in my judgment justifies careful scrutiny of the problem, as thought out by various schools.

Moreover, purpose must be interpreted broadly. It is not tied up essentially with any single manner of origin, or mode of realization. Orderly movement is the essential criterion. A machine-like universe moving toward a fixed goal would surely indicate purpose, even though

we should never find out what the purpose is. An absolute that eternally reorganized its inner parts would be purposive. And by the same token, a universe with no total goal would be purposive as regards its parts that come to fruition. Should we conclude that the cosmos is to end in utter oblivion, it would still be true that the mind of a Plato or of a Francis Bacon resulted from purposive processes of whatever origin and however operative. And especially would the result of human wills, or of human wills linked in a common cause fall within the scope of purposive processes. From some such broad view as this, we must approach the subject.¹

The various world views may be grouped roughly under three major headings, viz., the Materialistic, the Theistic, and the Humanistic.

MATERIALISM

(1) Materialism, or as it was known in its lower stages, atomism, levels man downward, and constantly looks with suspicion upon all that is not explainable by the locomotion of materials. This is an ancient notion of the way things operate, dating back, no doubt, far beyond Democritus, in whose hands the theory took more or less reputable form. But the atomic theory fared poorly, due no doubt to the long alliance of Aristotelian Philosophy with Theology, until in the seventeenth century it merged into a more general materialism. Regarding the elements not as properties but as bodies was an effort to find constant quantitative

¹ See *Purposive Universe*, Edmund Noble.

elements, and was a fruitful scientific method. But it was not quite so fruitful in philosophical results. And unfortunately for materialism, the atom has been found to consist of lesser units of uncertain nature, which sometimes take on rather spooky ways of behaving. So this effort to eliminate purpose from nature, or to reduce it to clocklike motions has resulted in more uncertainty as to what things are composed of and how they operate, than ever before in human history. If it be conceded that all is matter, then comes the query, what is matter? And any effort to answer this question requires the use of terms that are suggestive of anything else but a block universe.

(2) Mechanism is frequently confused with materialism. In fact, the old mechanism was rather materialistic. But mechanism, properly understood, encourages detailed experimentation, hunts down correlations, searches for differences that really make a difference. It tries to find out how in point of fact organisms really work. And it is hardly fair to identify present-day mechanism with the mechanism of the old materialism. The ever ready machine theory is not to be identified with mechanism as such. Chemical and biological processes do not act as do the parts of a machine. In other words, mechanism is expanding to fit the observed unitary facts of nature. Organism is mechanistic, but not in the kinetic sense; and it is vitalistic, but not in the dualistic sense.

(3) Nor should naturalism be confused with mate-

rialism. True, the old naturalism was defective in that it oversimplified the nature of things. It reduced the higher to nothing but the lower. The evolutionary idea had not gained great headway even in naturalistic circles when the old naturalism was at its height. So no place was provided for genuine novelty. Mind itself was not taken seriously, even as a variant of matter. The old naturalism was imprisoned within the facts and ideas and categories of the exact sciences. The biology and the psychology of even the nineteenth century were far from being the valid sciences that they are to-day. So the tendency of the old naturalism was to bring mind down to brain as kinetically conceived, instead of bringing brain up to mind as empirically known, as is the present tendency with evolutionary naturalists. But the old naturalism did keep all within one being, and it should be commended for attempting to explain the order of the universe on the basis of efficient causes without calling into service the doctrine of final ends as consciously held in the purposes of God.

But the most sympathetic interpretation possible of materialism and its allies, the old mechanism and the old naturalism, must admit their inadequacy for religious purposes.

THEISM

Theism is here interpreted broadly to include animism, vitalism, deism, theism, properly so called, and absolutism.

(1) In the early days of human life it was thought that spiritual beings, both good and bad, inhabited things and influenced or controlled their doings. This animistic, or as it is called in its earlier form, animatistic view, held sway far along into comparatively modern times, and in a modified way still commands the allegiance of many people. Indeed, vitalism is animism's sophisticated city cousin. Animism concerns itself not so much with ultimate and far flung purposes as with immediate ends. There are floating souls, or souls in general, that enter into relations with things and persons, sometimes briefly, sometimes taking possession for extended periods. All sorts of curious, unusual, or dramatic happenings are accounted for in animism by the purposive operation of spirits that inhabit the earth. The effort to get rid of evil spirits or to induce good ones to become operative has resulted in the creation of all sorts of ceremonies, many of which continue long after the spirits, that they were designed to placate, have faded into myths. Other souls inhere in rivers and seas and mountains, the winds and the heavens above. Sometimes these spirits rise to the position of presiding gods, thus passing from an animative status to that of a directive spirit. Fauns and the like constitute the souls of plants and trees. The souls of animals are manlike in ideas and mental processes. Man, himself, is in his basic nature soul, his bodily form being a more or less unnecessary impediment. The whole world is full of purposes and the means for their realization, but the idea of one inclusive or increas-

ing purpose has not yet dawned to trouble the mind of primitive man.

(2) Vitalism is an effective protest against the cock-sureness of mechanism, or at least of some mechanists. It is a thorn in the flesh of scientists who are tempted to wander along the road of vague generalization. It is a fighting philosophy. It searches diligently for holes in the armor of its opponents and upon finding them stabs with sure aim. Had vitalism stopped with this negative aspect it would still be worth special note. Its purpose, however, is not merely that of one who loves argument. It really believes in dualism. It challenges the self-sufficiency of the so-called physical realm. It posits a nonphysical agency, an *élan vital*, to explain the processes which it believes cannot be explained mechanistically. Professor Roy Wood Sellars, the leader of the American Critical Realists, says that "it is a mistaken philosophy that makes the vitalists dualists." "As the physical world was ordinarily conceived by scientists they had a right to be dualists. They were simply more courageous and more speculatively inclined than the ordinary experimentalist. But I do not think that they were very original, or they would have attacked the adequacy of traditional mechanism and the exclusion of mind and consciousness from the organic level of the physical world. They have, it seems to me, not been courageous enough. Why did they accept the traditional limitations assigned to the physical? The suspicion will not down that they were idealists at heart. Driesch and Bergson assuredly are, and, from his inter-

est in psychical research, I infer that McDougall is likewise. It is this too ready acceptance of the stereotyped view of the physical which betrays them."

(3) From early times, the shorthand explanation of mysterious or even commonplace occurrences was to credit them to the operation of God or gods. Man sorrowfully faced sure defeat when the gods were against him. He joyfully faced sure victory if they were allied with him. Always, however, there were sophisticated intellects who had their doubts about the adequacy of theocracy. But only the most courageous gave vent to their doubts. What happened was that the gods were gradually reduced in number and their functions quietly reduced in scope. Aristotle's prime mover is a case in point. Another is the whole movement, which in its later and more developed form is known as deism. For some purpose as yet unknown, God started the world going, established laws for its movements and then retired, leaving the vast machine to itself. I think the chief motive in deism is not so much to find what the end is, as to find what the beginning was. Getting things started was the big job, so God was regarded as the great First Cause. At best this idea of God was satisfactory only to those persons whose chief interest was speculative. It never warmed the heart to the point of discipleship. It left the world in cold isolation from the hearthstone of the old homestead, in sharp contrast with the brooding will of theism. Little wonder that theologians, with more or less consistency, balanced transcendence with immanence. In this effort to har-

monize transcendence and immanence is found the doctrine of Theism, properly so called.

(4) Theism, properly so called, is the hypothesis that the ultimate ground of the universe is Intelligent Will fulfilling a moral purpose, in the course of which he either consciously and specifically influences human fortunes, or so orders the cosmic situation as to make possible the realization of moral ends by human beings. This is a very satisfactory view for one who can bring himself to the point of holding it with deep conviction, but it seems to many persons to be inadequate. Romantically viewed, theism has the edge on all other forms of theocracy. But realistically viewed by one who wants to know the truth, even though the truth fail to set him free, the theistic hypothesis presents insuperable difficulties.

To apply such terms as "moral," "intelligent will," and the like to the ultimate ground of the universe, or to the universe itself, is to take terms that belong to the human realm out of their human setting and apply them to a totality which is nonhuman, though including the human. Moreover, it is noteworthy that only the good qualities of men are read into the ultimate. By the same process that one uses in arriving at a personal God, one might arrive at the idea of a personal devil. Nor are the doings of the cosmos such as to indicate that the term "moral" has cosmic significance in the sense that it has human significance. The universe seems to be either above or below good and evil. Cosmic forces are irreconcilable with theistic concern for human affairs. Theo-

retically, also, the theistic view is unsatisfactory. For the mere purpose of working out a predestined end a mechanistic arrangement would seem to be preferable. Such an arrangement would make unnecessary the conscious and specific influence of human affairs, or even attention to cosmic happenings.

It might be said in rebuttal that if the end in view were the production of free human personality, a mechanistic arrangement would not suffice. But in view of the moral waste on every hand, and the present conception of the vastness of the universe, with its millions of suns, such concern for human welfare seems highly improbable. Furthermore, the evidence, as evidence is ordinarily understood, for the theistic type of influence of human fortunes is lacking. By the common consent of the competent, the experience of God in the very act of influencing human fortunes is the only valid evidence. Such mystical experiences are rare, and such as exist are capable of explanation on grounds other than the theistic; and in any event they could have no primary validity for persons having no such experience. Evidence, to be scientifically valid, must be capable of verification under conditions of control. For these reasons, the theistic hypothesis seems to me to be an unsatisfactory way of finding purpose in the universe. That theistic theologians are aware of the inadequacy of theism as historically held, is evidenced by the fact that many of them are developing variations of the theory containing concessions that leave the old view very much the worse for wear. Thus Beckwith's Theory of a

Finite God; Wieman's Theory of God as a phase of the behavior of the universe; and G. B. Smith's Theory of God as that quality in environment that sustains human values.

(5) Closely related to theology, but essentially philosophical, is the theory of the absolute. The absolute, whether basically psychic or otherwise, puts the end in the beginning. All things work together for good. The ultimate outcome is sure and there is no real hazard. The eternal rearrangement of parts constitutes the activity of the whole. Genuine novelty is out of the question. The universe is sewed up from everlasting to everlasting. In its more extravagant moods, this theory is not satisfied with fixing the part irrevocably within the whole; it also puts the whole within every part. The idea of the absolute, however, is facing more and more opposition, till one may perhaps safely predict the abolition of the absolute. The good, the true and the beautiful are being transformed into the idea of good things, true occurrences, and beautiful situations. The theory of the relativity of things seems to be making great headway in all fields of thought. Not even the speed of light may be said to be absolute. At best, the accepted rate of the speed of light is only approximate. Light is not constant when passing through water or through a gravitational center. The "am—was—evermore—shall—be" arrangement, whether applied to parts only or to the whole, seems an unlikely situation. For religious purposes, the absolute is losing its significance.

So much for Materialism on the one hand and Theism on the other, neither of which do justice to the human situation.

HUMANISM

How is it with the humanist philosophy of life?

When a term has a lengthy, not to say embattled history, it is difficult of definition. Moreover, the emotional field that surrounds a controversial term is so charged with explosives that many persons in essential agreement with the point of view described resort to all sorts of intellectual and verbal gymnastics to show that what they are in fact they are not in name. But the opposition usually takes care to see that the proper term is applied. It then becomes the function of the victim to see that the term is accurately interpreted historically, that it is allowed contemporary enrichment, and that it grows toward the future.

A fruitful task for someone would be to show the continuity of the humanist emphasis from the nontheological movements of ancient times to the nontheological religion of to-day. This could be done by a comparative study of its meaning in its various phases and periods. For example: Etymologically, humanism means the doctrine of man. Historically it is an emphasis on nontheological cultural arrangements. Philosophically, it is a theory of life centering about human nature. In current usage it gives values a human rather than a cosmological setting. Obviously a term thus derived and used is a convenient symbol to designate a religious

philosophy that grounds its values in human needs. But my major purpose is to show the meaning of Humanism and only incidentally to justify the use of the term to designate the meaning.

In order to win its way in the world and to justify separate existence, a philosophy of life must attend worthily to certain fundamental problems; among them, the general setting of the philosophy itself, the understanding of reality, the nature and location of values, the question of freedom, and the development of persons in social relations. Let us see what Humanism has to say on these matters.

(1) *Humanism is a philosophy of life that interprets man within the setting of the organic conception of the nature of reality.*

"Organic" suggests the dominance of the teleological. That is to say, an organism seems to function to some purpose, form and process being subordinate to ends. Furthermore, the organic idea suggests evolutionary processes, purpose capacities, creative levels, plastic categories, diversity, uniqueness, mutual support, and the like. In the organic idea we may find a harmony of nature embodying all that is really essential in the old ideas of purpose. In an organism the past lives effectively in the present and projects itself into the future. Each organic level is what it is—physically, chemically, psychologically, but the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; and even the parts are different in the total setting from what they would be in isolation. In the organic there is an empirical teleology. There is a

cumulative, creative synthesis. The organic rises to mental levels. The idea of the future is purposive in the present.

In man, who is continuous with nature, purposive processes rise to new levels. In other words, human purpose is an intelligent effort to reach desired ends, and the goals of human purposes are natural occurrences coming into being by means of intelligent control and under conditions that admit of the probability of the occurrences. Human purposes are grounded in experimental experience, conditioned by the knowledge of relations, aim to attain goals that are adjudged valuable, and are directed by intelligence.

On the human level is purpose with intent. That is, prior integrative processes eventuating in results are raised to the selective level. By means of experimental experience we discover what prior processes are advantageous for human ends. We select such processes as serve us, and these we use as elements of new combinations of processes.

Human purpose in an organic setting is conditioned by objective relations. Not everything is possible—will power cults to the contrary notwithstanding. Our freedom to achieve purposes is limited by possible combinations of processes. But by learning how to be intelligent, by understanding the actual, by forming hypotheses, and by controlling relations we become participants in the creative processes. "Directed action," says Dewey, "is an achievement, not an original endowment."

The object of human purpose is the arrival at ends that are adjudged valuable in the human setting. That is to say, human purpose is the use of knowledge and technique in the quest for satisfactory existence in one's total setting.

(2) *Humanism is a philosophy of life that puts human nature at the center of the processes of knowledge, not as constituting but as conditioning the understanding of reality.*

Protagoras' dictum, "Man is the measure of all things," is fundamentally sound. Man is both the measure and the measurer. James and Schiller and Dewey are in varying degrees in essential agreement with this ancient Humanist in their refusal to dehumanize the processes of knowing. Ralph Barton Perry, in his *Philosophy of the Recent Past*, says "That thought is governed by purposes and related to the needs of life, is accepted by idealists and realists alike, and proclaimed by all schools of scientific thought." There is nothing surer than that human nature conditions our knowledge and that thought processes are related to the needs of human nature.

Schiller says: "To remember that Man is the measure of all things, i.e., of his whole experience-world, and that if our standard measure be proved false all our measurements are vitiated; to remember that Man is the maker of the sciences which subserve his human purposes; to remember that an ultimate philosophy which analyzes us away is thereby merely exhibiting its failure to achieve its purpose, that, and more that

might be stated to the same effect, is the real root of Humanism, whence all its auxiliary doctrines spring."

Let it be noted that we are talking about the conditioning of the understanding of reality, not for the present how reality is constituted. The verbal battles of the old "correspondence" theories for and against the independence of reality from the processes of knowing, which once consumed so much time, energy and "pulp," now seem a bit unreal, do they not?

But the *understanding* of reality is a different matter. At their best, doctrines of inspiration and revelation, cosmological theories and so-called laws of nature are only human instruments of understanding and control growing out of human experience and aiming at the service of human needs. Knowledge itself is a form of valuation; it is an instrument of life enrichment.

Our understanding of reality, then, is conditioned, first by the very *nature* of human nature. That is, being what we are, we understand as we do. And while we cannot transcend the possibilities of our own nature, the limits of understanding are by no means narrowly circumscribed. On the basis of past achievements we may reasonably expect great expansion in the understanding of our environing circumstances, and of our inner processes. Witness the astonishing developments in physics and astronomy, and in the social sciences.

Man's powers are released and mightily stimulated by the consciousness that there are no royal roads to knowledge, either of revelation or of a psychic nature, that he himself must achieve whatever knowledge he comes to

possess, and that his native powers of understanding are increasingly equal to the task.

Our understanding of reality is conditioned, also, by the *interests* of human nature. That is to say we seek knowledge in the direction of our interests and needs. It is a commonplace of modern educational psychology that the pursuit of knowledge should begin with immediate interests. And since knowledge is a form of evaluation with ethical significance, it may be added that moral programs not growing out of human interests lack essential motive power. There is no goodness *in vacuo*. As Roy Wood Sellars says, moral categories are "intrinsic to and characteristic of a certain kind of living."

Interests may be physical, as the desire for food; or emotional, as the desire for love; or æsthetic, as the desire for beauty; or speculative, as the desire for consistent theories; or they may all be subsumed in a larger generalization, as the desire for organic satisfaction. But in all cases the recognition of human interest is fundamental in the effort to understand ourselves and our world.

Again, our understanding of reality is conditioned by human *experience*. By means of experience human nature itself changes, interests change, and the whole human situation changes. As human nature expands, as its interests broaden, as its relationships multiply, older understandings of reality are found untrue or at best only partially satisfactory. Increasingly man becomes interested in the quest for uncertainty! Hence the spiritual value of the intellectual modesty that con-

stantly seeks new understanding. Who has not in his own experience gently laid to rest, with suitable floral offerings, many cherished convictions; sometimes even keeping the plot green for a long time by means of reinterpretations? The recollection of our "loved and lost" ideas should lead to a wholesome but undogmatic agnosticism. Likewise, the exhilarating experience of fresh understanding should lead us to hope for newer and better understanding. And as experience and observation become experimental they are found to be the only sources of dependable information regarding reality.

I have tried to suggest that being what we are, needing what we need, and experiencing what we experience, our understanding of reality is the understanding of beings whose nature, whose needs, and whose experiences are what ours are. Our understanding of reality is, no doubt, quite different from that of the amoeba, and doubtless a god would judge it not altogether satisfactory; but it is our understanding, growing out of our nature, our needs, and our experiences, and we must make the most of it. And besides, what other way is there other than that of human inquiry, by human means, in behalf of human ends?

(3) *Humanism is a philosophy of the natural rather than the transcendental, the human rather than the cosmic nature and location of values.*

One of the most generally discussed subjects to-day is that of values. The current idea seems to be that in value we have a term competent to unify otherwise

diverse points of view, and to mark the point of departure for new conquests. Let us fervently hope that such is the case. But certainly such will not be true unless the term "value" is given a definite, understandable meaning.

It should be noted that idealism in its various schools tends either to identify value with existence or to put it above existence. Naturalistic realism in its various schools tends more in the direction of the relative and interconnective nature of values. Humanism belongs in the latter tradition. That is to say, Humanism gives value a human and natural rather than a cosmic and transcendental setting. This is not to deny the organic continuity of man with the cosmos; but to recognize the obvious fact that cosmic doings appear not to be concerned with human doings, that values are on a level and in a setting that validate them without regard to cosmic occurrences, except, of course, in so far as we ourselves are a part of the cosmos.

The weakness of all forms of philosophical idealism appears, from a Humanist point of view, to be in the insistence on expanding concrete values to cosmic proportions. There is shocking lack of attention to the rules of evidence in leaping from the proposition, *I love my wife* to the conclusion, *therefore the Universe loves me*. Humanism holds that goods may be adequately valued for human purposes without cosmic moral significance. Professor Sellars says, "A Value is a thing valued." When it ceases to be valued it ceases to be a value. Without evaluation there is no value.

But a value judgment is not a purely personal whim. It arises in a social setting and is conditioned by human needs. That is to say, a value is not a value unless it satisfies; it cannot satisfy unless it meets needs; and needs grow out of nature, social experience and the interplay of self and the world. The process of valuation is not arbitrary.

On the contrary, we should cultivate the technique of comparative valuation. Humanism calls you to a hard task, not an easy one. For in the complex of modern life conscience is not a sufficient guide. Values must be compared, analyzed, harmonized. Conscience is merely a term descriptive of feelings, the origin and nature of which may or may not justify their continuance, feelings that are often contradictory and reversible. We evaluate wisely only when we know ourselves well enough to distinguish satisfactions that are attested by experimental experience from those that are ephemeral, when we know the nature of the objective world well enough to distinguish the more permanent from the more transitory characteristics. To the dictum of Socrates, "Know thyself," must be added, "Know thy World." Only so can we learn to evaluate wisely and well. As our limited knowledge of the nature of the cosmos should lead to great tolerance of opinion, so should our limited knowledge of the relations of self to objective situations lead to great tolerance of valuation. We cannot all hold the same opinions (how fortunate that is!), nor can we all enjoy the same satisfactions (that, too, is fortunate). But the fact that our

opinions and satisfactions are not universally applicable or of cosmic significance should not lead us to underrate their actual verifiable human worth.

(4) *Humanism is a philosophy of human control in contrast with all forms of fatalistic determinism as applied to human situations, and all forms of laissez faire as applied to social situations.*

This idea of human control is perhaps the most significant thing about the Humanist point of view. The theory that human intelligence can really make a difference in human and social situations renews hope and adds zest to activity. If things were divinely decreed or predetermined by necessity or in any other way absolutely sewed up "from everlasting to everlasting," then were our life on this planet an indescribable farce. If social situations (for example, the textile industry) were the inevitable results of impersonal laws of social and economic processes, then indeed were our efforts at social amelioration of no account. But happily there is no theory better supported by personal consciousness and human experience, than the doctrine of the possibility of the human control of our planetary destiny within the limits of our environing circumstances.

As Galsworthy says, "Humanism is the creed of those who believe that within the circle of enwrapping mystery men's fates are in their own hands . . . a faith that is becoming for modern men—perhaps—the only possible faith."

It is not my contention that action is free in the sense of being unmotivated or that the area of freedom is

without limit. The theory is that on new creative levels new motives are operative, new choices possible, new potentialities created, and new results effected.

There seems to be little difference of opinion on the statement that freedom is evidenced by consciousness, by experience, and by experiment. The trouble comes with the theoretical justification. And all that Humanism can here claim is that it confronts fewer difficulties in dealing with the question of freedom than do the various forms of absolutism. It must be borne in mind that we are dealing with the human level of existence, which subsumes the inorganic, the chemical, the organic, and the mental, and which in addition possesses qualities other than those into which it can be theoretically disintegrated. On this level the theoretical justification of freedom was argued by the late L. T. Hobhouse. As I understand his position it was this: The WHY of a thing has to do with either its cause or its purpose, or both. If explanation falls within the category of cause, it is called mechanistic; if it falls within the category of purpose it is called teleological. The mistake has been in drawing a hard and fast line between these two methods of explanation. Full explanation involves both methods. The cause category leads step by step to a teleological explanation; while the teleological category leads at least to a mechanistic explanation of method. Though here we must remember that mechanism in an organism is different from mechanism in a machine, as the human muscle differs from the gear shift of a

car. In a machine the teleological explanation must be referred to an external agent; in an organism the teleological explanation as well as the mechanistic is within. The circulatory process in the human body lends itself to mechanistic explanation, but even here the regularity of a machine is absent. The action of the heart and arteries appears to be determined by function, i.e., is more teleological than mechanistic. Nerve stimulus and reaction have not been reduced wholly to mechanical or chemical terms. So functional or purposive or intelligent processes are of the organic type, that is, the process is self-adjustable and self-variable. But certainly on the human level the determiner is not the end in view, but the *idea of the end in view*. The purposive idea is not only forward-looking, it is forward-moving in that it arouses feeling and dominates impulse. Consciously held goals have causal power.

The chief difficulty, however, is not so much that people are fatalists in theory as that they are fatalistic in feeling. They feel so inadequate. It is here that evangelical Christianity makes its great appeal, for beyond doubt emotional new births are needed. But such awakenings also accompany the full understanding that within natural limits we can actually control our world, so as to make possible a satisfactory life for all mankind.

(5) *Humanism is a philosophy of human well-being on the basis of man's inherent needs and aspirations, whether biological or mental, material or spiritual.*

Sometimes the term Humanism is used to designate those aspects of human life that are not common to both men and lower orders of the physical world. Nothing could be further from a proper use of the term, unless one is to follow "Humpty Dumpty" and make words mean just what one wants them to mean, nothing more and nothing less. Such a use of the term Humanism perpetuates the old dualism of the spiritual and the sensuous. But, in fact, Humanism insists on the essential oneness of human nature. And while for practical purposes of speech it may still be convenient to use the terms "material" and "spiritual," "biological" and "mental," it is to be distinctly understood that the realities designated by the terms overlap, interpenetrate, fuse, and are basically one. To separate in meaning that which is by nature one is an unfruitful process.

The ethical life of Humanism, then, is based on the actual situation of human nature. We are not disembodied souls living in a world of pure spirit, nor do we in fact seek to be. We have appetites and passions, hungers and thirsts, desires and aspirations. We have aches and pains, as well as joys and excitements. We must eat and keep warm, as well as think and aspire. And all these are of the very texture of the moral situation. The Humanist ethic is not life in accord with an absolute standard that never knew reality on land or sea, but life in the fullness of the inherent and the unique needs of individual man in his social setting.

The Humanist gospel aims to satisfy the whole of

human life, no phase of life being taboo. In most religions some of the deepest needs and most fruitful sources of abundant living, including the whole sweep of sex, have not only been ignored but actually repressed and positively condemned. But Humanism incorporates the physical as well as the spiritual in its very foundation.

But life is also freedom and loyalty and dreams and visions; and these are of the very texture of physical well-being, just as food and shelter and sex are of the very texture of spiritual well-being. Man cannot live by bread alone, nor can he live by visions alone. The soil of the earth blooms into the flowers of the spirit.

So Humanist religion plunges boldly into the thick of the battle for a full life for all mankind. It is interested in everything that concerns human life. The sweat of the shop and the grind of the market place, as well as the thoughts of philosophers and the dreams of seers. It sorrows over every wail of woe and rejoices over every far flung hope. Sometimes grimly, sometimes buoyantly, but always definitely and with the rear bridges burned, Humanism tackles life situations. Issues shift, needs change, men grow old and pass away; but always there remains the human struggle to wring a satisfactory life from environing situations that are sometimes none too friendly. But with greater knowledge comes greater control, and with greater control more visions of far reaching goals. With increasing knowledge and insight, with growing determination and

power, man moves steadily forward, striking from his soul the chains that nature and his older self have forged, courageously facing the present, and venturing in the face of greatest difficulties to chart the unknown to-morrow.

II

HUMANIST TRENDS IN MODERN RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENTS

THE study of trends has come to be regarded as a matter of major importance in the understanding of life processes. Not that there is any less interest in what has been nor in what now is. In fact, the past and the present are especially significant in what they indicate to be the direction things are moving. There has perhaps never been a time when more was being done than now to find out what has really happened in the ages past. All the fields of knowledge are being reinvestigated by scientific minds equipped with scientific method, technique, and apparatus. Out of the new knowledge thus made available is coming a tentative understanding of how the present has grown out of the past and what historical and current processes indicate for the future.

It would be difficult to overrate the importance of understanding trends. Many persons have wasted their lives, many movements have dissipated their energies in trying to keep alive ideas and programs which the trends of history have relegated to the realm of the "dodo." Lost causes as such may appeal to sacrificial heroism, but hardly to critical intelligence.

Not that we should summarily surrender to unde-

sirable trends, but rather that we should seek to control trends in the direction of desired goals. The limits of control, however, are determined by the facts that give significance to the trends.

When the persons most competent in the several fields of learning begin to modify or rationalize or abandon the things most commonly believed in their fields, we are then in the presence of a condition that obviously calls for study. If these persons, however they may differ among themselves in details, move in a given direction, then a trend is established. Some people will refuse to follow. Others will grudgingly move a few paces. Still others will pass through three stages; first, they will be in bitter opposition; second, they will say there is nothing new about the trend; and third, they will say that they have always believed in accordance with the trend. But the more courageous and far seeing will, from the very beginning, move steadily and surely in the direction of the trend, in so far as it appears in harmony with facts and ethical idealism.

Now, in basic religious matters, the usual dogmatic way of dealing with trends has been not merely to fail to understand them, not merely to ignore them, but to deny positively the very possibility of their existence. The faith "once for all delivered" has admitted of no change. But in spite of this hostile ecclesiastical atmosphere the spirit of man has refused to be subdued. The winds move in the tree tops. Indeed, the very roots of the trees are being torn from their bedding in the rock and the soil.

In so far as we are friends of what religion ought to be, we will give heed both to research when it tells us what religion has been, and to prophecy when on a factual basis it tells us what religion may become.

It is my thesis that in modern religious developments there are unmistakable trends that move from *theocentric* to *anthropo-centric* religion. Let us see how this holds in regard to various aspects of modern religious developments.

Significant trends are noted (1) in the study of religious sources, (2) in the appraisal of the dramatic religious leaders of history, (3) in the evaluation of doctrines, and (4) in the understanding of the nature of religion itself.

SOURCES

(1) In the study of religious sources we think first of all of the sacred literature of the world religions. In past ages, before the advent of the critical scientific study of documents, religious literature had a way of getting itself approved as peculiarly authoritative. This authority derived from the supernatural origin of the literature, or from the unique place held by its human author. Usually the human author merely mediated the message. When few people could read and write, and when still fewer could understand what was written, it was comparatively easy for writings to gain credence as the very word of God, or, at least, as the Modernist would say, the *norm* of religious experience.

So the Vedas and other sacred writings held sway in India; the Zendavesta, in Persia; the Tripitaka, in Buddhist lands; the Classics, in China; the Old Testament, in Orthodox Judaism; the whole Bible, in Orthodox Christianity; the Book of Mormon and the Pearl of Great Price, in Mormonism; Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures, in Christian Science.

But in recent times critical students have successfully challenged not only the verbal inspiration of sacred books but also the very idea of authoritative books as *norms* of valid modern religious experience. Back in the fifties, four young men were sent by the Brahmo Samaj, a liberal Hindu movement, to study the four Vedas at Benares and report to the mother Samaj in Calcutta. The result was the abandonment by this influential Hindu body of the doctrine of vedic inerrancy. It was fitting that this example should have been set by the Brahmo Samaj, for the founder of that movement, Rammohun Roy, was one of the fathers of that most helpful addition to the theological curriculum called Comparative Religion. In Christianity the smoke of the battle over higher criticism still lingers on the far horizon; but for the most part the Fundamentalists have been put to flight. Well known are the exposures of the real origin of the Book of Mormon and of Science and Health. In the various great religions critical heretics have blazed away at the scriptures, with varying results; but with the general effect that now the educated leaders of all religions look with a mingled expression of pain and patronage upon their

fellows who still appeal to the authority of sacred volumes.

With the passing of the unique origin of the sacred scriptures, their unique nature ceased to have unique authority. In other words, the trend is definitely away from regarding any ancient writing as the norm for modern religious life. The effect of this is not to rob the people of religious literature, but to increase the literary material available for religious purposes. All literature, ancient and modern, that is profitable for spiritual purposes is the sacred literature of humanized religion; and the burden is upon us to produce to-day literature that can equal and surpass that of yesterday.

(2) It is likewise with the institutions of religion; that is, religion in its organized form. In spite of the teaching of many great religious leaders to the contrary, their followers have generally regarded organizations, institutions, and places as religious sources. At times it has been a certain line of succession, at times a particular mountain top, at times a temple or a cathedral or a shrine. These and other visible and invisible evidences that peculiar sources of religious life were possessed have resulted in streams of pilgrims to these sacred sources from the most ancient times down to the most recent occurrence in Malden, Massachusetts. It has taken a long time for even a portion of the race to learn that the spirit of religion is not bound, that all worthful organizations and institutions and places are holy. But the present-day trend is definitely in the direction of regarding all inspirational move-

ments and places, all experience of art and skill and wonder as sources of religious inspiration. While this may finally have a sad effect upon the institutions of organized religion, it will, nevertheless, have a wholesome effect upon the life of mankind. The religious institutions that would survive must do so in open competition with all other human institutions. This again gives us not fewer but more sources of religious inspiration.

(3) With the passing of scripture and institutions as final authoritative religious sources, the Modernist type of mind fell in with the traditional mystical way and declared *experience* to be the authoritative religious source. Now this had a scientific sound. It made a universal appeal. It gave great promise. But the appeal to experience is already going the way of former religious sources. In its place will come, is now coming, *experimental experience*; that is, scientific method applied to the spiritual experience of man. Uncontrolled and uncriticized experience is no safer guide than the older authorities. Experiences are varied, multiple, and belonged to their setting. It is only by controlled experience, under conditions of testing, that we have good hope of using it as a dependable source. This has been pointed out by various persons these last years. Professor Wieman, of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, in an article in the *Christian Century*, gave solemn warning against appealing to uncontrolled experience as authority in religious matters.

Tests are being made to find out how experience is

influenced, what it means, and how it may be improved ethically; as, for example, in the character tests under the auspices of professors in Teachers' College, Columbia. Their volume on *Studies in Deceit* is illustrative of what I mean. The work of Professor Starbuck and his associates in Iowa State University is in a similar vein.

The sum of the matter is that the study of religious sources tends definitely away from the superhuman and authoritative to the human and experimental.

LEADERS

(1) How is it in the appraisal of the dramatic religious leaders of history? Most of the religions have been builded around the real or supposed teaching and personality of real or mythical founders. Hinduism and Shintoism are possible exceptions. The names of Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, Mohammed, Joseph Smith, Comte, and Mary Baker Eddy are associated with the origin and history of the religions with which their names are so intimately connected.

(2) To a considerable extent the same is true of the sects. Even John the Baptist is claimed by the sect that bears his name. The name of John Calvin is linked with Presbyterianism, John Wesley with Methodism, Alexander Campbell with Disciples, William Ellery Channing with the Unitarians, and so on. Most of the religions and sects are the lengthened shadows of dominant personalities. Great men have wrought mightily in behalf of their ideas of righteousness. They have not

always been original creators but they have embodied and dramatized the emotions and ideas of the inarticulate multitudes. Some of them have even made valuable contributions to religious life.

(3) The great-man-complex once held sway throughout all social life. The shadows of the Napoleons have fallen across the face of the earth. But nothing is surer to-day than the fact that social theory and the democratic spirit tend to discount, even to retire, the dramatic and oftentimes irresponsible leader, and to magnify the cumulative notions of many people and the possibility of expressing the public will. Coöperative plans of social life are urged not only as wise but as unavoidable ways of life. Our very souls are socially created. The shared life is as inevitable as it is profitable.

Current theory and practice move away from the dominant personality. Many of the outstanding wartime leaders of the nations have been retired by the suffrage of their fellow citizens; and the feelings and ideas and hopes of the peoples of the world are beginning to be heard in the councils of the nations.

(4) Nowhere is this trend away from the domination of dramatic religious leaders more forcibly set forth than in the changing attitude toward Jesus of Nazareth. Only a little while ago the Christian world regarded Jesus as nothing less than very God of very God. Then the Unitarians made him something less than very god, but more than merely man. The next generation of Unitarians made him very man of very

man. Then the Modernists followed suit with a view of Jesus as man, but what a man! He was used as a depository of all modern idealism. Others, however, challenged the doctrine of the adequacy of his moral and spiritual leadership. They pointed out that he said nothing against slavery although slavery was general in his day; that he said nothing against war although war was the chief honorific profession of his day. To the argument that his general teaching implied opposition to slavery and war they replied that the highest ethical leadership is not in abstract principles nor in pious professions, but in the concrete and the specific. Meaningful words must be tipped with steel and accurately aimed.

And not regarding these changes in attitude as enough came a whole bevy of critics saying that in point of fact Jesus never lived at all, that the whole Jesus fabric is mythical. Drews in Germany, Robertson in England, Smith in America startled the Christian world with slightly different theories of the nonhistoricity of Jesus. Various men, including Professor Shirley Jackson Case, of the University of Chicago, replied. But the late George B. Foster after examining the literature for and against the historicity of Jesus could only say, "Jesus is historically probable but not religiously necessary." As the battle progressed other works were written by Couchond of France, Brandes of Denmark, and Chowdhuri of India against the historicity of Jesus, and many more in behalf of his historicity or upon the assumption of it. But to-day it seems to me necessary

to go even further than the statement by Dr. Foster, and say, Jesus is historically doubtful and not religiously helpful.

(5) In my judgment, one of the greatest services that can be rendered to religion is to free it from the grip of the historic ethnic religious leaders. Thousands of modern minded souls in the midst of the new social setting and by means of the scientific spirit and method are more competent in the spiritual realm than were the fathers of the world religions and of the sects of Christendom.

The trend is away from one-man-religion and in the direction of a social quest to find satisfactory values for all mankind.

DOCTRINES

(1) The trend of modern religious thought in the evaluation of doctrines is also in the humanist direction; that is, away from the dogmatic and in the direction of the experimental. It is perhaps here that we find the greatest difference between the older and the newer mind in religious matters. The older mind thinks of religion as consisting largely of a set of doctrines, and of doctrines as rather definitely fixed. The newer mind thinks of religion as consisting largely of experimental quests, and of the conclusions of the quest as tentative, and, like prices, subject to change without notice.

The older mind did not hold doctrines as hypotheses but as certainties. He was concerned with finalities. He felt the need of anchoring to some rock of ages.

To doubt was to be damned. But the newer mind thinks of nothing so little as of certainty. In fact he rather doubts whether any certainty exists. He feels the thrill of novelty. For him it is postulates and hypotheses, not dogmas and certainties.

(2) The more modern minded of even the conservative clergy regard such basic doctrines as God, soul, and immortality as hypotheses. They defend these hypotheses on much the same ground as the scientists do theirs, namely, as working theories to be judged by their results. Now it is a far cry from this modern attitude to the old order in religion when a Jonathan Edwards spoke with absolute certainty of the will of the Calvinistic God to the immortal souls that hung on his words. There was a dramatic situation. Heaven and Hell were as real as Northhampton. Immortal souls hung in the balance. The responsibility of the preacher was beyond description. This situation accounted in large part for the great preaching of those days. It was likewise in the Hebrew tradition when prophets spoke the will of the eternal. But to-day it is difficult to get oratorical, much less eloquent over the tentative hypotheses that must constitute the metaphysical message of the modern preacher.

(3) But in the social realm it is different. What of a warless world? What of industry operated for the good of all? What of free peoples working out their own destiny? What of a new generation reared in the possession of the cultures of all times, and possessing the fruits of the arts to-day in all their richness

and beauty? What of minds freed of the fears that haunt them—fear of the past that presses upon them, fear of the overarching unknown, fear of the plagues that waste the body and the mind, fear of fear itself? These are causes that will give dramatic content to effective preaching in a humanized world.

The trend is away from doctrines considered as authoritative pronouncements about the eternal, and in the direction of doctrine considered as the orderly arrangement of convictions about everyday life.

RELIGION

(1) Thus may be seen the necessity for a re-statement of the nature of religion itself. Here again the trend is away from religion understood as man's response to "the determiner of destiny," to use Professor Pratt's terms, or even as man's response to superhuman sources of fortune; away from religion understood as "man's conduct facing Godward," as I was taught in my theological school days; away from the fascinating and poetic theory that religion is "the life of God in the soul of man"; away also from the notion that religion is necessarily tied up with any theistic interpretation of cosmic existence.

Rather is the trend in the way of regarding religion as a human effort to find satisfactory modes of living, in the course of which many personal, social, planetary, and cosmological theories may be postulated, tested, and abandoned; the abiding thing being the urge to newer and newer efforts to reach ever receding goals.

It is the testimony of Professor A. Eustace Haydon, of the Department of Comparative Religion in the University of Chicago, that to-day in practically all religions there are increasing numbers who interpret religion as the shared quest for a satisfying life.

(2) The very vernacular use of the term *religion* is tending to hasten the identification of religion with the questing process. When a man commits himself to a great *cause* we say that cause becomes his religion. We speak of men who make their art or their business or their social theory, their religion. Communism is said to be the religion of young Russia, as indeed it is.

Not long ago I attended an experience meeting in an orthodox Christian church where some ten or a dozen men testified. Every man of them told of his religion experience in terms of ceasing to do this and beginning to do that. Unconsciously they revealed the real nature of their religion. It was a human doing and not doing. The only trouble was that they were concerned with doing and not doing inconsequential things, such as card playing. But they identified religious experience with human behavior in a human setting.

A few years ago I had occasion to argue a matter before a commission studying a certain problem relating to theological education, of which commission the late Charles W. Eliot was a member. In the course of the discussion one of the commission, himself an overseer of Harvard, remarked that he was not interested in a type of theological education that turned out what

he called "social secretaries." Whereupon, Dr. Eliot, in his characteristically direct way said, "My dear sir, if I am not badly mistaken, within the next twenty-five or thirty years our idea of the very nature of religion will undergo a great change." That change is taking place even more rapidly than President Eliot predicted. To-day great religious organizations are committing themselves to concrete quests. One of the most effective examples of this is the work of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Practically all the great religious movements, including Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, have within the last ten years issued far reaching programs of social reconstruction.

(3) It is not likely that religion will cease to concern itself with the effort to understand man's cosmic setting, nor should it abandon such effort. It is natural that man should forever attempt to push back the veil of mystery that hangs so tantalizingly about him. Modern minds are well aware how painfully inadequate is our total knowledge; but they feel that the little knowledge man does possess is his instrument and his hope of further conquests of the dark. In controlling life situations a little factual knowledge is worth worlds of mystery.

Religion as thus understood is developing new ideals and techniques for accomplishing its purpose. Fact finding becomes more significant than wishful petition. What man really wants becomes of more concern than what it has been said that he should want. *Æsthetic*

expression is regarded as superior to monastic repression. Scientific apparatus ranks higher than sacred images. The free play of free minds replaces the submissive will. The buoyant thrill of physical and mental well-being are of first importance in spiritual well-being. Modern religion says to mankind, trust your capacity to understand increasingly the universe in which you live; trust your ability to order your way increasingly in harmony with the possibilities that inhere in the nature of man and the world; and so trusting, act accordingly.

In summary, the trend in modern religious developments is away from the transcendent, the authoritative, the dogmatic, and toward the human, the experimental, the tentative; away from the abnormal, the formal, the ritualistic; and toward the normal, the informal, the usual; away from the extraordinary mystic expression, the exalted mood, the otherworldly; and toward the ethical, the social and the worldly; away from religion conceived as one of man's concerns, and toward religion conceived as man's one concern.

III

HUMANISM AND HUMAN PROBLEMS

DEMOCRACY

IN a book by the venerable though misnamed "gloomy" Dean of St. Paul's, the Reverend William Ralph Inge, are numerous prognostications, including a brilliant chapter on the failure of democracy. He says that "Democracy in America means anything or nothing at all, which makes it an excellent slogan." Again he says that "Democracy is in the curious position of having no friends, though we all did lip service to it when we wanted to bring the Americans into the war." Then the witty, paradoxical, and sometimes irritating Dean adds, "One of the advantages of democracy is that it is so unworkable that it covers a whole system of shams, some of which are tolerably serviceable." And, finally, he quotes, apparently with approval, the saying of an American that, "Those who shout Abraham Lincoln's claptrap about government of the people, by the people, and for the people usually want to live on the people, by the people, and for themselves."

If the Dean were alone in his cavalier sallies on the forces of democracy we could dismiss the matter with little ado. But there are many others who have spoken in like manner. Von Sybel declared that universal suf-

frage heralds the end of popular government; de Tocqueville regarded successful democracies as smoothing the way for the next despotism; Mallock set definite limits to the functioning of pure democracy; and Nietzsche regarded democracy as one of the world's greatest sins.

Even the utterances of these prophets of impending calamity to unsuspecting democracy, might be dismissed as vaporous pronouncements of unsocial souls, but for the fact that democracy is not only challenged but flipantly tossed aside by three major schools of political thought, namely, the aristocratic, the dictatorial, and the proletarian.

(1) The aristocratic tradition takes the obvious fact that all people are not equal in stature or mentality and from this and other premises draws the conclusion that ability flows through the channels of a limited number of families. Despite the supposedly superior mentality of the aristocratic school they fail to note the fact that Jesus came from the household of a Nazareth carpenter, Lincoln from a Kentucky cabin, and that Gandhi is twice removed from the Brahmin. And in the world of business, as is well known, the captains of industry usually spring from the ranks. It is likewise in ecclesiastical affairs, especially in the Catholic church. In fact, the people who now take most seriously the old aristocratic theory of superplasmic succession are the remnants of a faded glory who use it as compensation for the present shortage of popular esteem on the part of hereditary aristocrats in general.

(2) But the dictatorial school presents a more serious situation. In Italy, Mussolini, himself from the ranks, seizes the reins of government and rides ruthlessly over the prostrate form of civil liberties. The black shirts swarm everywhere, pace the corridors of the trains, and are in general a threat to the freedom of Italians. But to the short-sighted, Mussolini is an efficient man. Has he not put labor in its place? Has he not cleaned the streets and alleys? Is he not draining a lake to restore Caligula's galleys? And is he not now rebuilding the famous Coliseum? What are human liberties, if radicals can be kept from the senate, intelligent criticism from the press, and rubbish from the streets? I have been astonished at the Pullman smoking-room comments of American business men on the greatness of this modern Cæsar who tosses Italian liberties to the winds. But we may feel fairly sure that in due time another Garibaldi will arise and that the tyrant will fall.

(3) The proletarian dictatorship is even more of a menace to democratic ideas. This is not to deny that the proletarian government in Russia did a good job in overthrowing the Czar and so bringing to an end one of the most disreputable of governments. Nor is it to deny the superiority of the proletarian dictatorship to that of both the aristocratic and the personal. However, I am not concerned with comparative dictatorships. I am concerned with self-government on the one hand, however inefficient, and on the other all dictatorships, however effective. Kings, Mussolinis, and pro-

letarian councils may command and compel results of a temporary nature, but the only social results that are spiritually and permanently worthwhile come from the volition of intelligent people expressing themselves through democratic channels.

(4) It is not that there is any reduction of the number of democratic countries. Indeed the form of democracy is still quite the vogue in governmental circles. The last century has seen the birth of many a democracy. In fact there has been so much homage paid to the form of democracy that the spirit has almost died, and when the spirit dies, the form soon decays. Our difficulties go deeper than the mere forms of government, and it is these difficulties that cause many thoughtful people to hesitate between what seems to them inefficient democracy on the one hand, and effective dictatorship on the other.

It is both honest and wise to admit our shortcomings. It is perfectly true that our great cities are horrid examples of bad government. Crime and politics walk hand in hand; that is, when not engaged in manipulating machine guns and throwing bombs. Wholesale robbery in connection with public contracts is the order of the day; and citizens who protest are thought to be a little "queer in the head."

Let it be admitted also that we are short in efficient government. Needed public improvements pass from committee to committee, from session to session, from government to government, and the public good is bartered for political advantage. And worse yet, while the

greatest feature of democracy is its provision for orderly change by registering the public will through the ballot box and legislative hall, we fall into the essentially anti-democratic way of worshipping the past and repeating old slogans. To follow Jefferson and Lincoln in their advocacy of change from time to time in governmental forms and ideals is likely to land one in the list of "undesirable citizens," along with Jane Addams, and a hundred more of the finest characters that America has ever produced!

(5) *Ideally, democracy is the faith of those who believe that within the limit of natural possibilities the fortunes of human society are in the hands of the people, to be worked out coöperatively in the light of growing ideals of individual integrity and social well-being and by means of whatever techniques and powers are available.* Obviously democracy as thus defined is far from being generally understood, or appreciated, or administered. Our task, therefore, is to find out what things are necessary to bring about the desired ends.

(6) I should like to list what seem to me to be the conditions of the successful operation of democratic society.

First of all is the will to democracy. Many people are so full of self-esteem, prideful habits, and vain illusions of their unique worth that it is rather easy for them to fall into the anti-democratic state of mind. Especially is this true of persons who for some reason or other suddenly come into wealth or power. He is a good man who can remember his own inadequacies

when all about him are those who acclaim his worth. Students, especially those fresh from college, are likely to fail to appreciate the real worth of their neighbors who have not been fortunate enough to go to college, and the members of their own household who have toiled to make their education possible. And then the many real differences that exist between people argue for the aristocratic way of society. What one should remember, however, is that good birth, good fortune in environment, and good opportunity for education are not blessings to be hugged to one's self, but instruments to be used for the common good. A clear sense of what might have happened to one under slightly different circumstances is a wholesome thing to keep in mind. But the will to democracy is not primarily a negative thing. It is a positive virtue. Democracy gives the opportunity to develop all that is in one and to rise to such heights as one's ability can support. It is not so with either the aristocratic or the dictatorial forms of society. Every person who wants a fair field and no favor for himself and for those who come after him should be committed body and soul to the task of making democracy work honestly and successfully in every phase of human society from the smallest unit to the League of Nations.

Given the will to democracy the next important condition is an educated populace. The forms of democracy and the will to democracy require for their fulfillment breadth of understanding and accuracy of inference. Never did a government act more wisely than did

America when she began her system of popular education. And Japan, while not yet a democracy is nevertheless wisely and rapidly educating her entire population. Japan now heads the literacy list of the nations of the world. The surest way to keep peoples in slavery is to keep them ignorant. Persons who believe in democratic society should resist all efforts to limit or handicap our system of public education.

Moreover, we should resist the effort to restrict education to those who by chance fit into the already existing molds of academic disciplines. Schools are notoriously hesitant about readjusting their disciplines to the needs of individual persons. There is every reason why everybody should study something, and why everything should be studied by somebody, but no reason why everybody should study everything. Successful democracy requires that all normal adults should be able to think factually and act purposefully in the light of history and current needs. This should be the minimum goal of modern education. And any admission that such is beyond the attainment of the people generally is in my judgment an unwarranted concession to social theories that are biologically unfounded, historically inaccurate and democratically disastrous.

But education in terms of mental equipment is not enough. Successful democracy requires nobility of character also. Recognition of this fact is responsible for interest in character education, which is now happily spreading throughout academic circles. Indeed, all great teachers have always been primarily interested in the

development of noble character. It is a great gain for both church and school, for both ministers and professors to recognize that character education is not confined to a single type of curricular content; but that character, or if you prefer, religious education is, or should be, character education. From kindergarten to university the aim of the educational process should be to foster noble thoughts, noble aims, noble deeds. Beyond the mastery of subject matter is the mastery of self; beyond the knowledge of history is the making of history; beyond the understanding of physical and psychological processes is the working out of these processes in the affairs of mankind.

(7) But to-day, perhaps the greatest need of democracy is competent leadership. Here is one of the vulnerable points of democratic society. We are not sufficiently discriminating in our choice of public leaders. We mistake bombastic utterances for seriousness of purpose. We allow demagogues to play on our prejudices and to blind us to real issues. We rally to the same old slogans and fall for the same old promises, election after election. We trust our most precious heritage of liberty to persons who have no real understanding of what liberty has cost or what it means. We trust great projects to men whose only qualification for leadership is the knowledge of how to get votes.

I think, however, that we are now beginning to develop a new attitude in this connection, to see that leadership is a matter of first importance, and to understand that social engineering is no less a technical matter

than is mechanical engineering. And my guess is that in the days to come, persons who "choose to run" will be subjected to severe tests.

Now, granted such general qualifications as education, character, and personality, what are the more specific qualities of competent leadership?

(a) The first is community recognition as a person of balanced judgment and seriousness of purpose. In serving on the boards of various community organizations, I have heard the personnel of city leaders discussed from many angles with view to naming them as members of committees or selecting speakers for civic occasions and the like, and it has been a revelation to me to see how little the man's political or religious connection has to do with his popularity and usefulness in the city at large. Very little consideration is given to his theoretical point of view if he is known to be disciplined, well balanced, and possessed of fortitude. Many a person has deluded himself with the idea that he was being discriminated against because of his general point of view. But, as a rule, if a man is discriminated against in his community it is not because of his creedal faith, but his lack of energizing faith. There are many ways whereby a man can win his civic spurs. Not the least of these is to discuss from time to time, both by word of mouth and in the printed page, important civic subjects. But the competency and delicacy with which these subjects are handled will color the community attitude toward the person who has ambitions for civic leadership. It is my conviction

that a man may treat any civic subject that he chooses without unduly disconcerting his fellow citizen, if he gives the impression that he still has an open mind and that he grants to his fellow citizens the freedom of thought and speech that he demands for himself.

(b) Another condition of effective leadership is a natural bent in the direction of social action. I do not hold that every person should attempt to become a leader in civic affairs. There are men whose bent is in other directions. Some may pursue scholarship in highly technical fields. Some may be best fitted for a restricted but intimate and devoted personal ministry. Others may possess such dramatic power as to make it wise for them to expend their energy in inspirational work. But one who is temperamentally fitted for civic leadership may be immensely useful both to his church and to his community by deliberately going in for public leadership.

Without going too far into the intimate workings of the soul, I think one may safely say that there is no such thing as an unmixed motive. Among the elements that go to make up a bent for social action is the desire for public recognition. One whose very nature thrives on public recognition and acclaim may very well become an effective public servant. It is not wicked to be popular nor to desire popularity. The wickedness is in choosing unworthy ways of attaining it. The desire to be known as a useful and leading public spirit is altogether to one's credit. I have never taken seriously the shrinking violet type. Some of the most egoistic persons I

have known were most insistent that they could never stand the blazing light of public recognition. What they really wanted was someone to shove them on to the center of the stage. But as with all good qualities, the bent for social action must be kept under control.

(c) Definiteness of purpose is another condition of competent leadership. I once heard a distinction made between a statesman and a politician to the effect that a statesman concentrates on one thing until he gets it done, whereas a politician flits from one thing to another never quite seeing anything through to the finish. One may doubt whether the distinction is well made, since a statesman may need to use many issues in behalf of his central purpose. Nevertheless, the *point* of the distinction is well made, namely, the necessity of definitely aiming at definite goals and persisting in the chosen direction until the goals are reached.

It is said of a certain minister that he is a good starter but rarely sees things through to a finish. There are so many things that need doing that there is great temptation to flitter away one's time with innumerable labors in behalf of good causes. But a leader must concentrate, so far as his time and energy are concerned, on a few causes and serve them well.

Frequently a civic movement starts off with a bang. All the civic minded are for it. The press plays it up. Churches discuss it. Clubs of various sorts encourage it. But shortly reaction sets in. Other things call for attention, and unless someone or at most some few persons stick to the original hope, the movement dies.

But if only a few stick, if only one sticks, the movement may survive the period of neglect and later come to the front with even greater force. Human attention and energy sometimes seem to move in cycles, but these cycles are really subject within large margin to intelligent control.

The worst difficulty is that the leader of a movement himself often grows weary or feels the pull in other directions. Was the thing originally worth while? What good will it do after all? At this point one's pride may serve a useful purpose. It is not to one's credit to start a good movement and drop it when difficulties arise. Just plain, good, old-fashioned pride has saved many a reform, when the reformer got to the point where it required scorpion lashes to whip his soul into further action.

Given anything like favorable conditions, the fixation of attention on a specific goal will bring the desired result.

(d) Another condition of competent leadership is the mastery of organization technique. Here I have in mind not the technique of filing systems, though these are useful and even necessary, but those psychological insights that grasp delicate human situations, whip them into shape, and marshal them for common action. There are few things more thrilling than committee meetings, especially if the committees are large ones. Creative chemistry is kindergarten in comparison with creative intelligence. Fusing things is simple and commonplace in comparison with fusing minds.

While organization technique almost partakes of the mystical, I think I see certain worldly processes operating. The unification of points of view can usually be found in a larger synthesis. Finding this larger synthesis is not altogether mystical. It is largely an analytical and logical process. Jews, Catholics, Protestants, and Unitarians can unite for freedom, for fellowship, for social service; but not for an evangelistic campaign. Orthodox Christians and atheists can unite to maintain a civic opera; but not to maintain a Bible school. Blacks and whites and others can unite to establish a park; but not a clubhouse, at least not frequently, though I look and hope for the day when they can and will do so. You will instantly think of dozens of illustrations of this point.

But the unification of points of view does not always actually get the desired results. Usually there are key persons without whose support progress is difficult if not impossible. The politician who makes good use of competent ward bosses is wise in his generation. Social workers have found that by getting hold of a gang leader quick and widespread reforms may be easily effected. Sometimes whole sections of cities and states and often whole movements are dominated by individuals.

Here, of course, I am talking about organization technique, not about education for democratic living. But you will need the help of key men even in putting over a program having as its aim possible democratic action.

No opportunity should be lost to form the acquaint-

ance of prominent community personalities. Use them as speakers on special occasions, put them on your mailing list, help them in some good cause. Cast your bread upon the water and it will return in due time.

In actually forming committees composed of such persons, representing various points of view, you can simplify your next step by concentrating responsibility in executive officers. An executive committee is essential for anyone who does not expect to live far beyond the threescore years and ten. Given the favorable report of a good executive committee almost any project can be put through the larger group to which the committee is responsible. This holds whether the larger group is a Chamber of Commerce, a Federation of Labor, a Woman's Club, a City Council, a State Legislature, or the people at large. The proper manning of a movement is more than half the battle.

(e) A final condition of competent leadership is personal idealism, supported by confidence that ideals are workable and that people respond to them. The genuine idealist sees the world through neither smoked nor rose-colored glasses. He sees it as it is, a curious mixture of good and bad. The recognition that things are not as they should be is prerequisite to making them what they ought to be; and the recognition of possibilities is prerequisite to dissatisfaction with things as they are. The kind of idealism that I am talking about is the most realistic thing in the world. Idealistic realism and realistic idealism are essentials of competent leadership.

Our idealism will be frequently challenged. Dis-

illusioned souls will say, "What's the use." Old fogies will say, "Let us alone." Practical-minded persons will charge us to let "good enough" alone. But we, as realistic idealists, will know that nothing is ever good enough, that new horizons constantly appear, that "new occasions teach new duties, that time makes ancient good uncouth." We will not too severely chide those whose step is slow and who can't keep pace with us. We will not call halt to those whose steps are even longer than ours and who may beckon from new heights. We will take a long look ahead at centuries yet to be, and will feel ourselves at one with all the hopes of the ages, and all dreams of noble men; and from our superior advantage we will make real the things for which the past has hardly dared to dream.

INDUSTRIALISM

Most people have thought of democracy heretofore as simply a type of political government; but now an increasing number of people see that democracy is a humanistic way of life to be used in the remaking of every sphere of our social arrangements.

(1) The next great reorganization is that of industry. The need for a change in our industrial life is evidenced by the appalling extent of poverty, the inequitable distribution of material goods among people who have not dropped below the line that separates life from mere existence, and the pauperous spiritual state of the excessively poor and the excessively rich.

When we consider the anarchistic type of mind

incited by lack of ownership, by unjust treatment, and by industrial maladjustments, we see that nothing short of a radical change in our industrial life can bring either safety or justice.

To complete the reformation from industrial monarchy to industrial democracy without a disorderly revolution is the greatest task that confronts America and the world to-day. In my opinion he who fears to face that task or who refuses to assist in working out the problems involved has no place as a teacher or a prophet in the modern world.

(2) Plainly, the existing industrial order is monarchic, modified here and there by oligarchy, limitations, checks, and the like.

The supremacy of a single will or of a hierarchy of wills still prevails in industry. By and large it is an arbitrarily constituted superiority. The natural superiority of industrial monarchs is a superstition. Fitness to survive must be taken in relation to a specific environment. Survival apart from its relation to the character of the environment proves no superior ability, much less moral and spiritual quality. In the underworld the crook is the fittest to survive. No man should speak of the survival of the fittest without explaining that he refers to a specific environment.

The hazard and the waste in our monachically organized business life are so great that if our industrial environment is right and only the survivors the fit, manifestly the human race is in a bad way. Only three per cent of the people in the mercantile business make a

financial success. Seventy-six per cent of the people leave no estate. Since 1900 there have been at least 500,000 commercial failures. The dethronement, the beheadings, and the wreckage of the present industrial order are enough to condemn it forever.

The utter dependence of the many—including most of those who labor by head as well as those who labor by hand—on the will of one or a few, the servile attitude of the many and the lordly attitude of the few, social cleavage and class consciousness, still exist in our industrial world, and they are characteristic of a monarchic order.

The laborer is to secure a "living wage." Why only a *living wage*? The first consideration in a monarchy is the welfare of the monarch. Industrial democracy demands a "living dividend" for the firm, i.e., for the machines and the machinery, and reward and fortune—if such there be—for all who toil, whether with hand or brain.

(3) Industrial democracy is the application by the people concerned of wisdom, skill, and energy to the production and distribution of material goods. Involved in this is control originating with and being responsible to the people concerned. From within the group, community, or nation comes initiative and operation. With the group, community, nation, or world (as the case may be) rests ownership. Gain or loss is equitably shared by all concerned.

Exceptions to monarchic and oligarchic reign in present-day industry mark the point of gain on the part

of the people in their war against monarchic and oligarchic rule. The movement away from ownership by one, and away from control from above, has made considerable headway through the centuries. It is an old movement and it constantly gains momentum.

In the days of old, both capital and labor were owned by the master. To-day, while the master still owns the capital he does not own the laborer. The gain for the laborer is considerable. His body at least is free; and he himself may negotiate with capital in a more or less open market.

Partnerships, corporations, and similar oligarchic combinations are distinct gains on the old order. Profit-sharing, co-partnership, joint boards of control, trade unionism and such have made substantial gains on industrial monarchy. Profit-sharing is so common that it hardly attracts attention, whether between capital and labor, or capital, labor, and consumer. Co-partnership between employer and laborer—that is, sale by the employer and purchase by the laborer of an interest in the business—is increasingly popular. Proctor and Gamble, and other concerns have long seen the wisdom of at least a limited degree of co-partnership between employer and employee. Nelson and others have found co-partnership between capital, labor, and consumer a reasonably safe practice. The coöperative stores of Great Britain have a membership of three millions and an annual trade of eight hundred million dollars. If these concerns, and many others throughout the world, can survive in an antagonistic environment for even a

brief period—such survival creates at least a presumption in favor of the principle of coöperation, and gives ground for a reasonable faith that if the principle were generally applied, and if it were safeguarded and backed by a community or national or world program, it would be not only workable but triumphantly successful.

(4) The complete democratization of industry cannot be brought about in a day. There is no cut and dried formula that we may follow. There is and can be no final democratic program. New situations must forever teach new lessons. Experimentation by the people is of the very essence of democracy.

As things look now, the most important immediate step in the democratization of industry is the extension of the laborer's control of production. And no raise in wage, no bonus for unusual skill, no sharing of profits, much less free movies, gold watches, and horseback rides, can satisfy labor in lieu of *actual participation in the control of production and distribution*.

A second step must be the severing of the secretarial and managerial force from the employer, where its alliance now is, and the union of the secretarial and managerial force with labor, where it rightfully belongs.

And along with these steps must come an increased functioning on the part of a democratically controlled community, nation, and world. Here political democracy and industrial democracy join hands. Neither can succeed without the other. Both moving along together can make it possible to have a reorganization of industry without the disorder of a sudden revolution.

(5) In this democratic movement all men must avoid class consciousness and emphasize the unity of labor. All who toil, whether with head or hands, are workers. All progressive social programs recognize the unity of labor. The old manual labor theory of values has gone by the board. Hand laborers and brain laborers cannot afford to waste their time fighting among themselves.

Let us keep before the minds of the people the interdependence of all—all groups, communities, and nations. No person, group, or nation can live unto itself alone. There is no natural conflict between legitimate interests. There is world-wide community of interest. Anarchistic competition is a thing of the past; it has been found utterly inadequate in a complex, organized society.

Let us emphasize not the equalization but the equitization of the fruits of industry. Democracy aims not to level down, nor to level at all, but to equitize. Above certain just and adequate minimum standards of living, and within certain fair limits, there must be ample room for individual initiative and achievement. But no man should be allowed to build his monumental achievement at the cost of underfed, poorly clothed, and inadequately housed men, women, and children.

Potential wealth is inexhaustible. We are learning how to dig from the depth of nature or to create what we need or want. There is no reason to fear the universalization of poverty. There is every reason to expect and make leisure and plenty the possession of all. We

need simply the vision to see what is right and possible, and the courage to do it!

PEACE AND WAR

During the fateful days of the summer of 1914, I was delivering lectures in which I proved conclusively, at least to my own satisfaction, that the nations of the world were so interrelated, commercially and otherwise, that international war on a large scale would never again take place. Upon leaving the platform one afternoon I went out onto the street and heard the newsboys announcing the beginning of hostilities which resulted, as you know, in the greatest war of all time.

In those days, most of us were unrealistic in our attitude toward international matters. But, there were social scientists who had long been telling us that the piling up of armaments would eventuate in just such a calamity as we witnessed from 1914 to 1918.

Never shall we forget our war time experiences. Those of us who had thought war on a large scale impossible, and especially those of us who opposed America's entrance into the war, found it very difficult to readjust our thinking rapidly enough to be in harmony with the war time spirit that speedily pervaded the country. Most of our fellow citizens, for the time being, lost all sense of proportion. Many ridiculous things occurred. In Des Moines, Iowa, where I lived during the time that America was engaged in the war, I picked up an afternoon paper and saw a story to the effect that an Austrian had boarded the train in Grin-

hell and was on his way to Des Moines, that he had in his possession a bottle containing some sort of infernal chemical, and that he was probably planning to blow up the city. A later edition said that he had been met at the station, arrested and put in jail. No explanation was given as to why he was allowed to get on the train and come to Des Moines with such direful plans in prospect. Several days passed, then appeared a brief story to the effect that a priest had interviewed the prisoner and learned that the bottle contained holy water!

Another example of war time mentality was an Iowa judge who, when sentencing a violator of a war time law, delivered from the bench a lengthy oration, which was later printed for wholesale distribution, denouncing the socialistic principles of the prisoner. Just what the political opinions of the prisoner had to do with the specific charges against him was not made known.

Then came the eleventh day of November, 1918. And the whole country was thrilled with the announcement of peace. I myself never shall forget the demonstration in Des Moines. The downtown streets were jammed with almost the entire population of the city. Traffic officers were literally helpless and yet no one seemed irritated over the confusion. From a window of one of the highest buildings hung an effigy of the Kaiser.

Then came the days of almost universal discussion of peace plans and projects, which discussion has continued to grow in volume. And now, in order that we may

continue moving in the right direction, I think it is needful that we get a clear outline of the major attitudes toward the problem of peace and war.

(1) The first major attitude is that war is a manifestation of biological law, and since human nature cannot be changed, war is inevitable. It is true that the struggle for existence has developed patterns of war in the brains of most people. We are told by competent scientists that we are largely motor beings and that we act as we do chiefly because our brain patterns are what they are; that our brain patterns are the result not only of our own experiences, not only of our childhood training, but also of the behavior of our prehuman ancestors. Much is made of what is called the biological origin of war. Our early ancestors were driven by powerful enemies to the trees, where they developed hands and increased in strategy. They then returned to the ground of their enemies to resume the fight. Later they discovered fire. They converted metals into crude tools. They captured and tamed animals. They forced the ground to produce food and shelter and clothing. They turned nature against their enemies. Men fought each other. New methods of killing were invented and the crimson path became more crimson. The fighting "instinct" so called, grew and became so powerful that to-day it is urged as one of the main arguments for war.

But it is forgotten by those who urge the biological origin of war that, in evolution, mutual aid is a factor of first importance. Prince Kropotkin, in his little book called *Mutual Aid*, has proved beyond doubt that

mutual aid is no less significant in the evolutionary process than is the competitive struggle for existence.

Moreover, the advocates of the biological necessity for war forget that by the careful scientific application of pedagogical laws, peace patterns may be substituted for war patterns in the brains of the new generation. Human nature is, in point of fact, the most plastic thing in nature. A peace environment would work wonders in molding the action patterns of the next generation. That this is possible is evidenced by what man has done for certain lower animals—animals that had developed to be life destroyers more than man. In the brain of the dog, whose ancestors' preservation depended upon the killing of other animals, the old action patterns have been greatly diminished, and peace action patterns greatly augmented. Surely our brains and the brains of our children are as capable of development as are the brains of the dog. What man has done for lower animals, surely he can do for himself and his children.

The problem, therefore, seems to be to change by education and environment the war action patterns to peace action patterns. This cannot be done suddenly. But there is hope for a measure of favorable results in one generation, for training and environment are able frequently in one generation to offset to a large extent the heredity of ages. If an animal grows up in the wilderness it becomes wild; but if reared and trained by man, its action patterns to a large extent are domesticated. If Christians had been reared in a Mohammedan

environment and Mohammedans in a Christian environment, Christians would be Mohammedans and Mohammedans, Christians. If Americans had been reared in Germany and Germans in America, Germans would be Americans, and Americans, Germans; autocrats would be democrats, and democrats, autocrats. Such is the power of training and environment. The world must be changed from war to peace by changing war training and environment into peace training and environment.

We should have our greatest talent not at the head of armies and navies, not at the head of boards of strategy or industry, but at the head of our government institutions of learning. Professor Crile has suggested that we must see that our children learn the biological disadvantage of war as well as the biological causes of war. He says we should let the consequences of war be as evident as the glory of war: Let the patriotic departure of the father or son be paralleled with the black night that hovers over the wife, mother and child; the glory of the gun and bayonet, with their bleeding, groaning victims on the bomb-torn battlefields; the monument to the victorious general who scarcely saw fire, with the little crude wooden crosses marking the graves of a thousand unknown patriots. Compare the staff commander's report with that of the surgeon-general; the brilliant uniforms that go into battle with the blood-begrimed rags that come out; the strong-bodied patriots that gloriously march into battle with the fragments gathered together and buried in trenches, and the dismembered, nerve-wracked boys who return

to shattered or deserted homes. Compare the blissful charge at Mons with the awful retreat from Mons to Marne where, for nine days, the retreating boys had no chance to sleep, except to slow down and sleep as they walked; when they cared not for capture or death, if only they could sleep! Let the textbooks of the world be rewritten. Let us see that our children learn to honor and glorify the men of toil and industry and science. Let every pedagogical principle known to the science of education be applied by the strongest men and women we know, to the elimination of the patterns of action that lead to war, and the formation of the patterns of action that lead to peace.

(2) A second major attitude toward the problem of peace and war is that of the enforcement of peace by superior force. It is the typical militaristic position. Militarism is the "spirit and temper which exalts the militaristic virtues and ideals, and minimizes the defects of military training and the cost of war and the preparation for it." Among the advocates of militarism are many admirable persons whose integrity and honesty of purpose cannot be questioned.

Nevertheless, militarism is subject to two important indictments. First, it is lacking in faith in the power of ideals other than those backed by gun and sword. And second, it has failed to point the way to enduring peace. Little wonder that militarism is lacking in faith in the power of things spiritual, since faith naturally deteriorates under armor plate and is debauched by the frenzied piling up of arms. For years the militarists told

us that armaments were the only sure guarantee of peace—that armaments were a sort of peace insurance. Men who said they knew what they were talking about, wrote it, published it, spoke it. Peace, they insisted, depends upon the size of armies and navies. The nations accepted this doctrine, piled up armaments, were ready for war—and as might have been expected, war came. In our present state of development, armaments to do police duty may be defended, but armaments sufficient to engage in offensive war and a military class to urge it, cannot be defended.

The attitude of those who believe in maintaining peace by superior force is also the position of the Imperialists. The stock arguments of the Imperialists are that superior wisdom is possessed by the successful powers—the so-called great powers—and that the backward peoples, being incapable of self-government, need outside control. It is on this theory that Great Britain holds India, that the United States holds the Philippines, that France holds Syria. And it is on this theory that every imperialistic power justifies its use of other peoples, irrespective of their needs, for the interest of the governing power.

I think perhaps the most powerful argument against Imperialism is that no nation is sufficiently powerful morally and spiritually to govern another people, without suffering the degeneration of its own soul. It is proverbial that the soul of the master degenerates with the body of the slave. It would be quite impossible to overestimate the damage to the spiritual life of Great

Britain, resulting from her control by coercive means of India and other countries. And already we in America are beginning to pay the price in loss of the love of liberty, for our own imperialistic doings.

Moreover, it should be remembered that people cannot be coerced into cultural growth. Culture is a social behavior pattern which has grown out of the thought and life of a people themselves, or of customs and ideas that are deliberately chosen by them. A people may be persuaded to adopt foreign ways of life, but they can hardly be forced to do so. The bodies of a people may be kept in subjection for generations, but their spirits will be in a constant state of rebellion and sooner or later the rebellion will break into the open. This very thing is happening now on a large scale in India, in Palestine, and in Syria. Nothing seems to me to be surer than that coercive, militaristic, imperialistic methods not only do not produce peace, but are certain to produce war.

(3) A third major attitude toward the problem of peace and war is that of arbitration. Without doubt the principle and the practice of arbitration have effected great good in international relations. It is one of the glories of America to have led in the signing of arbitration treaties. We sent the first case to the Hague Court, and were largely responsible for securing the permanency of the Court. Before the beginning of the World War, we offered practically an unlimited arbitration treaty to the great nations.

Among the arguments for arbitration are these: First,

it represents a willingness to give and take. In all other human relations we find it necessary to concede many things which on theoretical grounds we believe to be our rights, and to grant to others things which we believe they have no reasonable right to expect. It is a wholesome thing to carry this spirit over into the relationships between nations.

Again, the principle of arbitration admits the possibility of error due to proximity of interests. When a person is very close to a situation it is easy to fail to see the rights and interests of others. A fundamental principle of getting along with one's neighbors is that of willingness to admit quite freely the possibility of error in one's judgments. Arbitration carries this principle over into international affairs.

But perhaps the chief argument for arbitration is that it actually makes use of competent, unbiased opinion. The agreement of nations to submit their differences to the opinion of competent persons, who have no selfish interests to serve, is a great step forward in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Obviously, arbitration is a move in the right direction. Nevertheless, there are sound arguments against arbitration which I think set definite limits to it. First of all, there is the danger of settlement for settlement's sake, without due regard for the rights involved. This danger is, I think, especially noticeable in the settlement by arbitration of disputes between capital and labor. It is also noticeable in the arbitration of minor disputes between neighbors. The danger is that arbitrators will

feel that their primary duty is to secure a settlement, and if one party to the dispute is more vigorous than the other, he is likely to gain concessions from the arbitrators, and finally from his opponent, which may or may not harmonize with justice.

When arbitrators are considering the differences between nations, they, too, are likely to feel that they can overlook so-called technical questions, which sometimes involve fundamental liberties, if by so doing they can bring about a quick settlement. But in my opinion such procedure does not make for enduring peace.

Again, there is the unconscious bias toward the claims of the powerful nations. I do not say that this bias always operates, even unconsciously in the arbitrators. What I claim is that the danger of its so operating is sufficient to put the arbitration procedure in grave suspicion when the settlement is between a powerful, successful nation, on the one hand, and a small and struggling people, on the other.

Moreover, the policy of arbitration left the legality of war unchanged and unchallenged. The challenge to the legality of war came not from the advocates of arbitration, but from another quarter, about which I expect to speak more at length a bit later. There is a vast difference between a mere agreement to settle disputes without war, if possible, and the other principle which says that war itself, whatever its cause, shall be regarded as utterly illegal and of no standing whatever in international relations.

(4) A fourth major attitude toward the problem of

peace and war is that of disarmament. In recent years there have been various attempts made to reduce armaments by the agreement of the nations to accept certain ratios. It has been argued by the advocates of disarmament that the laying down of arms and the sinking of ships on the part of some powerful nation, would be an example to the rest of the world, which would probably result in a more or less general disarmament. Thus far, however, no one of the great nations has deemed it feasible so to do. And it is highly improbable that, had a nation done so, the result would have been as expected by the advocates of disarmament.

Also, it has been argued that disarmament merely as a policy of economy would have a marked effect upon the prosperity of nations. To me, this seems a valid argument. A very large percentage of the budgets of nations now goes for wars, past, present, or to come. Think what could be done in the way of great public improvements—roads building, establishment of parks and playgrounds, the extension of educational opportunities and the like, with the money that now goes into the building of ships, the purchase of armaments, the upkeep of armies and navies, and other warlike expenditures.

A modern argument for disarmaments is that science is developing so rapidly that a given means of warfare is out of date by the time it can be completed and made ready for use. What are battleships and guns, when a few chemicals can destroy a city? In spite of

the tremendous moral appeal that the disarmament program has made to all who think idealistically, it must nevertheless be pointed out that to secure disarmament was hardly possible, so long as war was a legal method of settling international disputes—just as legal as the appointment of commissions of arbitration.

Moreover, the ease with which new armaments are produced, or new methods of warfare developed, makes disarmament less significant than would at first seem to be the case. Indeed, it seems to be possible for people to fight irrespective of the nature of their weapons. There were wars before modern armament existed. Stones and sticks were, and still are, dangerous weapons. Now that war has been outlawed by international treaty agreement, it would seem that disarmament should proceed apace; but even here we must not expect too much in the way of disarmament until the peoples of the world have had time to realize just what is involved in the renouncing of war as an instrument of national policy.

(5) A fifth major attitude toward the problem of peace and war is that of nonparticipation. Some years ago, Sir Arthur Ponsonby started in England what came to be known as the Ponsonby Plan. The scheme was to secure the signatures of tens of thousands of people to an agreement never again to participate in a war. Another example of this type of opposition is the conscientious objector. And while this plan has the advantage of appealing to the heroic qualities in indi-

viduals, it nevertheless fails to take into consideration the corporate realities of international relations.

Following the World War, the *Christian Century* advocated the excommunication of war. The idea seemed to be that the ministers and the churches and religious conferences should agree never again to support a war, whatever its cause. Various student groups fell in with the idea, and in general the plan was helpful as a means of calling the attention of people to the utter inconsistency between war, on the one hand, and the Christian principle of brotherly love, on the other. But this plan failed to take into account the overlapping claims of church and state.

The general theory of nonresistance has many supporters and a considerable literature. Jesus is claimed as a nonresistant, and his admonition to resist not evil is the scriptural basis of the movement. Tolstoy was one of the greatest of the modern advocates of the principle. It was, however, pointed out from time to time, that nonresistance was in fact a method of super-resistance. This is the idea of Gandhi, who conducted in South Africa and later in India, a movement called non-violent noncoöperation. In India, at present, Gandhi is leading his people in open rebellion against British rule. Noncoöperation has passed into positive violation of British-made laws and regulations. And while the principle of nonviolence still holds with Mr. Gandhi himself and his followers, it is practically certain that the movement cannot permanently remain nonviolent.

(6) A sixth, and final, major attitude toward the problem of peace and war is that of outlawry. The idea of the outlawry of war is one of those epoch-making ideas that come only at infrequent intervals in the life of mankind. The father of the idea is Mr. S. O. Levinson, of Chicago.

Back in 1917, Mr. Levinson, who had two sons in the war, realized as he had not before, that the nations and the peoples of the world were in the grip of a monster system, which they did not like, which they feared and hated, but which they seemed utterly powerless to control. He reflected that this system was supported by four-fifths of the international law then in existence; that it was enriched by the overwhelming percentage of the budgets of the nations; that it was glorified in the press, in the pulpit, and in the textbooks of the world.

He saw the practical impossibility of regulating the thing; that it must either be accepted or outlawed. Upon further reflection he recalled that all great issues were at bottom moral questions, and that, ideally, law should be found on the moral side of all issues. From such reflections came the idea of putting the law of the nations on the side of the opposition to war. This meant a complete facing about. Whereas the nations had from time immemorial marched foolishly but legally in the direction of war, Mr. Levinson's idea was that they should face about completely and march intelligently and legally in the direction of peace.

Senator Knox was one of the first converts to the

idea, and later Mr. Levinson won the support of Senator Borah and the philosopher, John Dewey. Other men of note joined Mr. Levinson, including Charles Clayton Morrison, editor of the *Christian Century* and author of an authoritative volume called *The Outlawry of War*. The movement rapidly grew until it became a veritable gospel with an increasing body of literature and competent exponents.

The idea of outlawry includes three essentials. The first is the agreement by International Treaty to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. When Briand wrote to the American Secretary of State, proposing a bi-lateral treaty, he used the term "outlawry of war" and referred to it as an American term. You are familiar with the lengthy discussion that followed Briand's proposal, which resulted in not a bi-lateral, but a multi-lateral treaty, and which has now been signed by practically all the nations of the world. The Paris Peace Pact, now a part of the basic law of mankind, and representing a complete change in the mind of the world on the matter of war, is the direct outgrowth of the idea of outlawry as conceived in the mind of S. O. Levinson.

Renouncing war as an instrument of national policy means that all disputes are either to be settled by peaceful means or to remain forever unsettled. But it is the belief of the advocates of outlawry that the intelligence of the world is sufficient to find peaceful means of settling disputes when there is no longer the danger of warfare.

A second essential of the outlawry of war is the codification of international law on the basis of the illegality of war. This step has not yet been taken by the nations, but it must be taken in due time. The Peace Pact has scrapped the majority of international law; and time will be required not only to evolve new laws on the basis of outlawry, but also to recodify existing peace laws. In the future the body of international law will consist of the laws of peace, based upon principles of equity and justice, a large part of which will, no doubt, be taken from the equity codes already developed in civilized countries. And the old laws applying to conditions of warfare, rules and regulations of battle, contraband, neutrality and the like, will be abandoned.

The third essential of outlawry is a World Supreme Court, depending for its sanctions on the good faith of the peoples of the world, on enlightened public opinion, and on world sentiment against war. Our own United States Supreme Court is an example of what is meant. The Sovereign States of the American Union have settled by way of the Supreme Court ninety controversies without the shedding of a drop of blood.

The peace philosophy that underlies the outlawry idea is:

1—that force should never be used in the settlement of international disputes; 2—that the peoples of the world can be depended upon to keep their word in agreeing not to go to war; 3—that in the operation of the World Supreme Court there shall be no obligation on the part of the participating nations to use force in

carrying out the decisions of the Court; 4—that all world machinery, such as confederations and leagues, should function wholly on the basis of the voluntary action of the nations; and 5—that the supreme sanction of peace is the might of right.

IV

CONCLUSION

FROM the foregoing chapters it may be seen that from the Humanist point of view the basic materials in religion are the characteristics and needs of human nature. The first duty of religion, therefore, is to find out what these characteristics are and what they need for their harmonious development.

In the past man has tried many ways of arriving at dependable conclusions, but none has been found that can compare in verified results with the way called scientific. By scientific is meant the experimental method, which, in turn, means observation of phenomena, either under conditions of control or over such a wide area of time or change that results can be treated statistically. The effort to limit science to the fields of physics and chemistry is a hangover from the old days when science had to fight for recognition in even these fields. But now science has won its spurs and may rightly claim as its objective the understanding of the whole field of reality.

As with other subject matter, the elements and the needs of human nature, if ever understood, must be understood by means of the methods and instrumentalities of science. The very complexity of human

nature, which is sometimes urged against the possibility of such understanding, is in fact a strong argument in behalf of the necessity for the scientific way. In other fields, where other methods of understanding have failed utterly, science has won significant victories. The more difficult the field the greater the challenge; the greater also the opportunity for triumph. It is difficult to find out what is needed to develop humanity with the least waste of human materials and the greatest opportunity for the unique living of the many temperaments and races that make up the world. This cannot be done by any hit or miss method, nor by appeal to the ancients, nor by intuition. It requires all the intelligence and the techniques that man possesses or can attain.


To the objection, then, that human nature is beyond the reach of scientific method, let it be said that the achievements of science thus far give good ground for hope. The trustworthiness of the scientific method in its use thus far may be urged as ground for its further extension.

It may be objected that religion is in the realm of æsthetics, and that in this field science is incompetent. This objection, however, is based on a misunderstanding of both science and æsthetics. Discrimination is of the very essence of æsthetics; and the very habit of discrimination requires for its development careful observation and verification. Lights and shadows are not indiscriminately beautiful; they are so only under certain conditions; and these conditions are proper subje-

matter for scientific inquiry. It is similar with love and emotional experiences in general.

Humanism, of course, has no monopoly on the scientific method. This method is becoming the common possession of mankind. But it may be said that Humanists, more than others, are wholehearted in their acceptance of it. To hold the scientific method grudgingly and partially is in large measure to fail to understand it. Science will bestow its blessings upon all; but its spirit belongs only to those who accept it with a whole heart.

In former days the subject matter for interpretation was biblical and the method of interpretation was rationalistic; now the subject matter is human nature and the method of interpretation, scientific. Formerly the object was to gain scriptural support for doctrinal developments, and to be found within the limits of Christianity; now the object is to test doctrines by their service of human needs, and increasing numbers desire not to be found within the limits of any ethnic faith. Thus are we moving from sectarian Christianity to Humanist religion.



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